Showing posts with label continuity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label continuity. Show all posts

August 2, 2012

How Short Outages Become Long Outages

Early in the morning of Friday July 27, 2012, Hosting.com experienced an 11-minute outage. Although service was restored very quickly, many customers weren't prepared and experienced hours of downtime as a result (source).

The key story here is that even though a few minutes of hosting provider downtime is probably well within the parameters of the service level agreement (SLA), the customer's actual downtime far exceeds that. I'm going to quote my own blog from just a couple weeks ago because it accurately sums up the situation:

Your cloud (or other hosting) provider no doubt promises a certain amount of uptime in their service level agreement. Let's imagine that allows one hour of downtime per year. If they have one minor problem it could cause downtime of just a few minutes. But if your systems are not prepared, that interruption could corrupt databases, lose transactions in flight, crash applications, and wreak all manner of havoc. Their downtime glitch will become your costly business disaster unless you are prepared in advance to control it on your end (source).

Hosting.com's Service Level Agreement is posted publicly on their website (source). A quick read reveals that it does NOT promise 100% uptime. Datacenters fail, and that's a fact of life. When signing with any hosting or cloud provider, it is vital that you understand exactly who is responsible for what, and whether total downtime is measured according to the unavailability of their infrastructure or the amount of time it takes you to recover.

Recently, the Paris-based International Working Group on Cloud Computing Resiliency (IWGCR) found that costs for outages between 2007 and 2011 among the 13 providers they reviewed exceeded $70 million (source). No SLA from any provider is going to compensate for those kinds of losses. If the industry demanded this of them, no hosting provider would be able to stay in business. It will be far better for their customers to invest in reliability than to expect dollar-for-dollar restitution after a disaster.

Background: Hosting.com and its Customers

According to the company website, "Hosting.com is a next generation cloud hosting and recovery services company focused on ensuring your mission-critical applications are AlwaysOn™" (source). They are a leading provider of other enterprise hosting solutions and services as well, with datacenters in Dallas, Denver, Irvine, Louisville, Newark, and San Francisco. One source says they host over 65,000 websites (source). This includes financial services, healthcare, media, retail, software as a service (SaaS) providers, and content distribution networks (CDN) (source).

In contrast with other recent outages and other providers whose explanations were late or non-existent, Hosting.com CEO Art Zeile stepped up very quickly during this crisis and alerted his customers of the problem, its cause, and its effects. Though they won't be thrilled with news like this, customers need clear communication and honesty from their providers. That way they know what to tell their own customers and management, and their overworked internal IT teams will have a better chance of taming the chaos. I applaud Mr. Zeile and his actions. We need this level of leadership to benefit the cloud industry at large.

The Problem: Human Error, a Power Outage, and a Chain Reaction

Mr. Zeile explained that "An incorrect breaker operation sequence executed by the servicing vendor caused a shutdown of the UPS plant resulting in loss of critical power to one data center suite within the [Newark, Delaware] facility" (source). The power was back on within 11 minutes, but "customer web sites were offline for between one and five hours as their equipment and databases required more time to recover from the sudden loss of power."

I wasn't there but I can surmise what happened. When the power went out, an unspecified number of servers were shut off without proper shutdown procedures. Applications and databases were abruptly terminated. Other applications and databases that depended upon them suddenly lost transactions in flight. They crashed too, taking down other apps and databases in turn. And so on down the line in a classic cascading failure scenario.

Recovery of the customers' crashed apps and databases required hours. Each customer needed its own data and apps restored, and those that were still running probably had to be shut down and then re-started in proper sequence. Servers had to be checked for damage after their "crash" shut-downs. Apps and data that successfully cut over or failed-over to secondaries had to be cut over again, from the secondaries back to the primaries, and I'll bet there were further failures as that happened.

The Solution: Make Your Datacenters Expendable

Many of the apps and data on the system were undoubtedly protected by failover and backup recovery architecture, or by one of the Hosting.com business continuity solutions. Many of these certainly continued running as they successfully failed over to their secondaries. But equally clear is that apps and data for about 1,100 customers (1.7% of the total Hosting.com customer base) did not continue running. Either they were not equipped with adequate business continuity systems, or the failovers failed. One writer quotes Zeile as saying that although Hosting.com offers a backup option "few customers, at the affected location, had elected to purchase it" (source).

I am unaware of any hosting or cloud provider who publicly promises 100% uptime. So the customer must expect to have some amount of downtime, if only for maintenance. Logically, customers need to provide adequate business continuity systems to protect themselves.

Datacenters go offline all the time for any number of reasons. Thus, your business needs to be able to continue talking to customers, sending billing statements, shipping goods, and paying creditors despite untoward events like power outages, fires, human error, hardware failure, and so forth.

ZeroNines does not recommend or use a failover- or backup-based recovery paradigm. We take a different approach aimed at preventing downtime in the first place, rather than recovering from it afterward. In the case of the Hosting.com outage, Always Available™ architecture from ZeroNines offers two solution scenarios:
1)  Hosting.com already operates multiple geographically separated datacenters. Always Available architecture would allow processing to continue on any or all of the remaining five when any one of them goes down.
2)  Hosting.com customers could deploy their own Always Available array that would simultaneously replicate all transactions and data on other Hosting.com datacenters, or in other clouds or with other providers.

In either case, the end user experiences no downtime because the remaining nodes continue processing as usual. The offending datacenter simply drops out of the array until power is restored or until your staff can repair it. The other nodes of the Always Available array will update the damaged node once it is functioning again, and bring it to an identical logical state.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

July 30, 2012

Azure and Google and Twitter, Oh My!

The flying monkeys attacked in force on Thursday July 26, 2012, taking down cloud leaders Microsoft, Twitter, and Google Talk. It seems the cloud is no Yellow Brick Road after all, guiding merry executives to some imagined Oz where the sun always shines and outages never happen.

The more I talk to IT planners, the more I find they are looking at reinvesting their cloud savings into business continuity. They rightly hope to compete based upon reliability, and to protect their businesses by exchanging the extremely high and unpredictable costs of outages for the predictable and low costs of the cloud and business continuity. They've clearly got the right idea, especially when you consider the noise outages like yesterday's can make.

Microsoft Azure
  • Area affected: Europe, via the Dublin datacenter and Amsterdam facility.
  • Duration: About two and a half hours.
  • Cause: Unspecified, but one expert suspects infrastructure troubles.
  • Effects: Loss of cloud service throughout Western Europe. Businesses like SoundGecko were unavailable.
  • Source: WebTechInfo.com
"In Azure’s case on Thursday, the constant availability of power and lack of a software culprit, such as the Feb. 29 one that downed several services, points to 'more of an infrastructure issue' where some undetected single point of failure in a network switch or other device temporarily disrupted availability, said Chris Leigh-Currill, CTO of Ospero, a supplier of private cloud services in Europe." (source)

Google Talk
  • Area affected: Worldwide (source).
  • Duration: About five hours.
  • Cause: Unspecified, but one expert suspects a bad hardware or software upgrade.
  • Effects: System unusable, granting access but providing only error messages.
  • Source: TechNewsWorld.com
"Outages like this 'often happen as the result of a hardware or software upgrade that wasn't properly tested before installation,' Rob Enderle, principal analyst at the Enderle Group, told TechNewsWorld" (source).

Twitter
  • Area affected: Worldwide.
  • Duration: About an hour and possibly more in some areas.
  • Cause: Datacenter failure and a failed failover.
  • Effects: "Users around the world got zilch from us."
  • Source: CNN
"Twitter's vice president of engineering, Mazan Rawashdeh… blamed the outage on the concurrent failure of two data centers. When one fails, a parallel system is designed to take over -- but in this case, the second system also failed, he said" (source).

Am I Repeating Myself? Am I Repeating Myself?

My last blog post was titled "A Flurry of July Outages – And All of them Preventable". On Thursday we had another flurry, and all of them in the cloud. And I have to say again, with caution, that these were preventable. I am cautious because we don't know for sure if Mr. Leigh-Currill and Mr. Enderle are correct in their assumptions about the Azure and Google service interruptions, but if they are correct then these outages were almost certainly preventable.

And the Twitter outage was clearly a case of failover failing us once again. That's what it is when "a parallel system that is designed to take over" fails to do so when the primary goes down. It's the same story we see over and over again.

After all these years in the industry I am still amazed that the biggest tech names in the world continue to rely on the ancient failover paradigm. The leaders of these organizations are trusting their reputations, their revenue, their shareholders' profits, their customers' businesses, and potentially peoples' lives to a disaster recovery process that quite likely won't work.

What Some Companies are Already Doing About It

Earlier in this post I mentioned the companies that are reinvesting cloud savings into reliability. These are typically smaller, more agile companies. They'll be able to take on the tech behemoths based on reliability, because they are thinking beyond mere cost savings and efficiency. They see the cloud as a means of creating their own "failsafe" hosting paradigms.

As most readers of this blog know, Always Available™ technology from ZeroNines replaces failover and backup-based recovery. It is already cloud-friendly. The Twitter outage is exactly the kind of thing we prevent. Companies hosting an Always Available array on Azure would have had virtually no risk of downtime, because all network transactions would have continued processing on other nodes. Always Available prevents data disasters before they happen, whether a power supply fails, or software gets corrupted, or a tornado picks up your Kansas datacenter and relocates it to Munchkinland, or someone melts your servers with a bucket of water, or the flying monkeys carry off the last of your support staff. Why clean up after an expensive disaster if you can prevent it in the first place?

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

July 12, 2012

The Cost of Cloud Outages and Planning for the Next One

At least one customer is publicly abandoning the Amazon EC2 cloud after two power-related outages within a month. Online dating site WhatsYourPrice.com is walking out, going back to a more traditional local hosting provider (source). And so the heat is still on in the East, with high temperatures still making life difficult and with the Amazon cloud beginning to lose customers.

What is the Real Cost of Cloud Outages?

This question is difficult to answer, as little hard data is available. Cloud providers and cloud customers keep the financial numbers closely guarded, whether we are talking about the customer's lost business and recovery costs, or Amazon's losses due to lost revenue, restitution paid to customers, customer attrition, and the increased difficulty of acquiring new customers.

Coincidentally, a report on cloud outages among top providers came out on June 22 2012. In it, the Paris-based International Working Group on Cloud Computing Resiliency (IWGCR) claims that costs for outages between 2007 and 2011 among the 13 providers they reviewed totaled $70 million. Their estimates were based on "hourly costs accepted in the industry" (source).

Downtime and availability rates are reported for Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft, Research in Motion (RIM), and others. Total downtime was 568 hours, and availability was 99.917%, nowhere near the five nines (99.999%) that is becoming the de facto target for acceptable uptime.

Although it’s useful to put a line in the sand and publish studies on the cost of outages, such surveys are virtually impossible to do accurately. I don't think that even big analysts like Gartner are able to get a good view into the real costs. Unfortunately, this article does not make it clear whether the $70 million was the cost to providers, to customers, or both. Also, the sample size was pretty small and apparently there is no information about actual customer size. I know first-hand that many of our clients claim their downtime costs start at $6 million per hour and average $18-24 million per hour. Apparently only outages that made the news were included in the report, so this leaves a lot of actual downtime out of their equation, such as small glitches and maintenance downtime that journalists don't hear about. Because of all this I know the actual costs must be higher. Despite all the unavoidable barriers to accurate measurement, such studies are still valuable because they highlight the bottom-line impacts. They also demonstrate just how difficult it is to estimate the cost of downtime.

40% of Cloud Users are Not Prepared

"Light, medium, and heavy cloud users are running clouds where on average 40 percent of their cloud — data, applications, and infrastructure — is NOT backed up and exposed to outage meltdown" (source).

This was said a couple weeks ago by Cameron Peron, VP Marketing at Newvem, a cloud optimization consultancy that specializes in the Amazon cloud. He was referring to his company's clients and the June 15 outage.

If the average cloud customer is anything like these companies then it is no wonder that cloud outages are such a concern. Another writer referred to this kind of planning (or lack of planning) as "stupid IT mistakes" (source).

Who's at Fault?

So when a cloud customer experiences downtime and loses money, who is actually to blame? The cloud provider who failed to deliver 100% uptime, or the cloud customer who was unprepared for the unavoidable downtime?

According to Peron, "Amazon doesn’t make any promises to back up data... The real issue is that many users are under the impression that their data is backed up… but in fact it isn’t due to mismanaged infrastructure configuration." (source)

Cloud customers need to be prepared to use best practices for data protection and disaster prevention/recovery. They need to remember that a cloud is just a virtual datacenter. It is a building crammed full of servers, each of which is home to a number of virtual servers. And all of it is subject to the thousand natural (and unnatural) shocks that silicon is heir to.

Cloud Customers Need to Take Responsibility for Continuity

So here's some friendly advice to WhatsYourPrice.com and others like them: whatever hosting model you choose, get your disaster plan in place. An outage is out there, waiting for you in the form of a bad cooling fan, corrupt database, fire, flood, or human error whether it's in the cloud, your own virtual servers, or a local hosting provider.

Best practices and DR discipline should not be taken for granted simply because the datacenter is outsourced. Many companies that I meet with have gone to the cloud to cut costs, and many of those are reinvesting their savings into providing higher availability. They're looking ahead, trying to avoid disasters, outcompete based on performance, and support customer satisfaction.

Even before the advent of the cloud, new generations of low-cost compute models enabled disaster recovery standards that could prevent a lot of downtime. But they are often poorly executed or ignored altogether. And now, with it being so easy to outsource hosting to "the cloud", it is even easier for companies to shake off responsibility for business continuity, assuming or hoping the folks behind the curtain will take care of everything.

I say that the primary responsibility for outages is the customer's. If you're providing a high-demand service you need to be ready to deliver. It doesn't matter if you can legitimately blame your provider after a disaster; your customers will blame you.

Your cloud (or other hosting) provider no doubt promises a certain amount of uptime in their service level agreement. Let's imagine that allows one hour of downtime per year. If they have one minor problem it could cause downtime of just a few minutes. But if your systems are not prepared, that interruption could corrupt databases, lose transactions in flight, crash applications, and wreak all manner of havoc. Their downtime glitch will become your costly business disaster unless you are prepared in advance to control it on your end.

It's like a tire blowing out on a car; the manufacturer may be responsible to a degree for a wreck, but if your seatbelt was not fastened then all bets are off. Safety systems are there for a reason.

Make it so Any Datacenter is Expendable

ZeroNines offers a solution that enables the complete loss of any datacenter without causing service downtime. We believe that if WhatsYourPrice.com was using our Always Available™ architecture, their dating service would have continued to operate at full capacity for the duration of the outage, with no impact to the customer experience.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime. You may also be interested in our whitepaper "Cloud Computing Observations and the Value of CloudNines™".

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

July 5, 2012

Multi-Region Disasters and Expendable Databases℠

As I write this, the United States is suffering from a frightening heat wave and the lingering effects of storms that threatened everything east of the Rockies. Over two dozen lives have been lost and the heat might last for several more days. The transportation, emergency response, and utility infrastructures are badly strained; about a million customers are still without power. Major fires are burning in the west. It is distressing to think about this kind of multi-region disaster, but it is happening now and continues to unfold.

And as trivial as it feels to write this, these natural disasters led to another outage of the Amazon EC2 cloud on June 29. This one is very similar to the EC2 outage on June 15 which I blogged about last week (source). Friday's happened at the same Virginia datacenter and was also caused by the same kind of event.

The Problem: Another Power Outage and Generator Failure

Similarly to what happened a couple weeks ago, on Friday a storm-induced power outage at the utility company forced a switchover to Amazon's backup generator, and this generator failed (source). Netflix, Instagram, Pinterest, and others began to experience difficulties and outages. The problems lasted about an hour.

But rather than dissect this one outage, let's take a look at the larger issues surrounding downtime in the cloud.

Cloud Users Must Plan their Own Disaster Recovery

Wired.com had this to say about Friday's event:

In theory, big outages like this aren’t supposed to happen. Amazon is supposed to keep the data centers up and running – something it has become very good at… In reality, though, Amazon data centers have outages all the time. In fact, Amazon tells its customers to plan for this to happen, and to be ready to roll over to a new data center whenever there’s an outage. (source)

Long and short, cloud customers think that they have shed their responsibility for business continuity and handed it to the cloud provider. They're wrong, and Amazon has apparently admitted as much by telling its customers to make their own disaster recovery preparations.

"Stupid IT Mistakes"

Those are the lead words in the title of an article about the June 15 outage (source). In it, the author refers to statistics from cloud optimization firm Newvem that show that 40% of cloud users are not properly prepared for an outage. They don't have any kind of redundancy: they don't back up their data and they deploy to only one region. Frighteningly, this includes large companies as well as small.

Promoting a Failure of a Recovery Plan

Another problem is that Amazon has apparently told its customers to "be ready to roll over to a new data center" (source). This is tacit approval of failover-based disaster recovery systems. But as we saw with the June 15 outage, failovers fail all the time and cannot be relied upon to maintain continuity. In fact, they often contribute to outages.

As for regular backups, that's always a good idea. But a backup location can fail too, particularly if it is hit by the same disaster. And what happens with transactions that occurred after the last backup? Will a recovery based on these backups even succeed? And although backup may eventually get you running again, it can't prevent the costly downtime.

You Can't Prevent All Causes of Failure

I argue again and again that there is no way to prevent all the thousands of small and large errors that can conspire (singly or in combination) to knock out a datacenter, cloud node, or server. Generators, power supplies, bad cables, human error and any number of other small disasters can easily combine to make a big disaster. It's not practical to continually monitor all of these to circumvent every possible failure. IT is chaos theory personified; do all you can, but something's going to break.

Geographic Issues

As we are seeing this week, one disaster or group of disasters can span vast geographic areas. You need to plan your business continuity system so the same disaster can't affect everything. Companies that have located all their IT on the Eastern Seaboard should be sweating it this week, because it's conceivable that the heat wave and storms could cause simultaneous power outages from New York to Virginia to Florida. A primary site, failover site, and backup location could all go down at the same time.

The Real Solution: Geographically Separated Expendable Datacenters℠

Here at ZeroNines we've constructed our business continuity solution around a number of tenets, including:
  • Service must continue despite the complete failure of any one datacenter.
  • Geographical separation is key, to prevent one disaster from wiping out everything.
  • Failover is not an option, because it is extremely unreliable.
  • The solution must be easy and affordable so that the "40%" mentioned above actually use it.
Based on all this, we've developed Always Available™ architecture that enables multiple instances of the same applications, data, and transactions to run equally and simultaneously in multiple locations hundreds or thousands of miles apart. The system does not rely upon or include either failover or restoration from backup. Best of all, an entire datacenter could go offline at any moment and all transactions will simply continue to be processed at other datacenters with no interruption to service. It is affordable, OS agnostic, and operates with existing apps, databases, and infrastructures.

ZeroNines client ZenVault uses Always Available. They also host on Amazon EC2. During the outages, no extraordinary measures are needed. If the EC2 East node goes offline, the two other nodes (in Santa Clara and EC2 West) will continue running the service, and will restore the EC2 East node once it comes back online. ZenVault has had true 100% uptime since the day it launched in 2010.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

June 28, 2012

Outage at Amazon EC2 Virginia Illustrates the Value of the Expendable Datacenter℠

The Amazon EC2 cloud had a relatively minor outage a couple weeks ago, on June 14 2012. As it turns out, it happened in the same Virginia datacenter that spawned the April 2011 and August 2011 outages. I've been on the road but now that I look into it I see that it's actually a classic outage scenario and a classic example of cascading failure resulting from a failover. It also illustrates just why you need to plan for Expendable Datacenters℠.

Background: Amazon and Their Cloud Service

I blogged about Amazon's big outage last August (source), and described how large a role Amazon plays in the cloud world. I won't recap all that here, but I will say that among its clients are Netflix, Instagram, Reddit, Foursquare, Quora, Pinterest, parts of Salesforce.com, and ZeroNines client ZenVault.

The Problem: A Power Outage

According to the Amazon status page (source) "a cable fault in the high voltage Utility power distribution system" led to a power outage at the datacenter. Primary backup generators successfully kicked in but after about nine minutes "one of the generators overheated and powered off because of a defective cooling fan." Secondary backup power successfully kicked in but after about four minutes a circuit breaker opened because it had been "incorrectly configured." At this point, with no power at all, some customers went completely offline. Others that were using Amazon's multi-Availability Zone configurations stayed online bu seem to have suffered from impaired API calls, described below. Power was restored about half an hour after it was first lost.

Sites started recovering as soon as power was restored and most customers were back online about an hour after the whole episode began. But it is clear that many weren't really ready for business again because of the cascading effects of the initial interruption.

Subsequent Problems: Loss of In-Flight Transactions

The Amazon report says that when power came back on, some instances were "in an inconsistent state" and that they may have lost "in-flight writes." I interpret this to mean that when the system failed over to the backups, the backup servers were not synchronized with the primaries, resulting in lost transactions. This is typical of a failover disaster recovery system.

Another Subsequent Problem: Impaired API Calls

Additionally, during the power outage, API calls related to Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) volumes failed. Amazon sums up the effect beautifully: "The datastore that lost power did not fail cleanly, leaving the system unable to flip [failover] the datastore to its replicas in another Availability Zone." Here's a second failed failover within the same disaster.

My Compliments to Amazon EC2

In all seriousness, I truly commend Amazon for publicly posting such a detailed description of the disaster. It looks to me like they handled the disaster quickly and efficiently within the limitations of their system. Unfortunately that system is clearly not suited to the job at hand.

Amazon does a pretty good job at uptime. We (ZeroNines) use the Amazon EC2 cloud ourselves. But we hedge our bets by adding our own commercially available Always Available™ architecture to harden the whole thing against power outages and such. If this outage had affected our particular instances, we would not have experienced any downtime, inconsistency, failed transactions, or other ill effects.

One Solution for Three Problems

Always Available runs multiple instances of the same apps and data in multiple clouds, virtual servers, or other hosting environments. All are hot and all are active.

When the power failed in the first phase of this disaster, two or more identical Always Available nodes would have continued processing as normal. The initial power outage would not have caused service downtime because customers would have been served by the other nodes.

Secondly, those in-flight transactions would not have been lost because the other nodes would have continued processing them. With Always Available there is no failover and consequently no "dead air" when transactions can be lost.

Third, those failed EBS API calls would not have failed because again, they would have gone to the remaining fully functional nodes.

A big issue in this disaster was the "inconsistent state," or lack of synchronization between the primary and the failover servers. Within an Always Available architecture, there is no failover. Each server is continually updating and being updated by all other servers. Synchronization takes place constantly so when one node is taken out of the configuration the others simply proceed as normal, processing all transactions in order. When the failed server is brought back online, the others update it and bring it to the same logical state so it can begin processing again.

The Expendable Datacenter

Another thing I can't help but point out is the string of events that caused the outage in the first place. First a cable failure combines with a fan failure, and that combines with a circuit breaker failure. It's simple stuff that adds up into a disaster. Then software that can't synchronize. Given the complexities of the modern datacenter, how many possible combinations of points of failure are there? Thousands? Millions? I'll go on the record and say that there is no way to map all the possible failures, and no way to guard against them all individually. Its far better to accept the fact that servers, nodes or entire facilities will go down someday, and that you need to make the whole datacenter expendable without affecting performance. That's what ZeroNines does.

So if you're a cloud customer, take a look at ZeroNines. We can offer virtually 100% uptime whether you host in the cloud, on virtual servers, or in a typical hosted environment. And if you're a cloud provider, you can apply Always Available architecture to your service offering, avoiding disasters like this in the first place.

Check back in a few days and I'll write another post that looks at this outage from a business planning perspective.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

January 27, 2012

The Legal Ramifications of Cloud Outages

Here's a public service announcement for cloud customers and cloud service providers alike: If you're not doing something to significantly increase the reliability of your cloud systems, you should prepare your legal team.

Take a look at this article; it's a great primer to get everyone started: 5 Key Considerations When Litigating Cloud Computing Disputes by Gerry Silver, partner at Chadbourne & Parke.

I agree with Silver who sums up the situation nicely when he says that "given the ever-increasing reliance on cloud computing, it is inevitable that disputes and litigation will increase between corporations and cloud service providers."

Understandably, both cloud users and cloud providers will want to dodge responsibility for cloud outages. "The corporation may be facing enormous liability and will seek to hold the cloud provider responsible, while the cloud provider will undoubtedly look to the parties' agreement and the underlying circumstances for defenses" [source].

Looks like the future is bright for attorneys who specialize in cloud issues. After all, a faulty power supply or software glitch could lead to years of court battles.

Five Legal Elements

Silver outlines five key elements for the legal team to consider:
  • Limitation of liability written into service contracts.
  • Whether the Limitation of Liability clause can be circumvented: can the cloud provider be held responsible despite this clause?
  • Contract terms: A breach of contract on either side can greatly affect litigation outcomes.
  • Remedies: During the crisis the corporation could demand that the cloud provider takes extraordinary steps to restore systems and data.
  • Insurance and indemnification: Insurance may cover some losses, and a third party may bear some responsibility for the problem too.

The Disturbing News: Expectations are Low

In my travels, I am still surprised at how little thought goes into the liability associated with an outage whether it be in a data center, cloud or hybrid configuration. Although I embrace everyone’s motivation to move to the cloud, I found a couple of points in Silver's article disturbing because they shed light on the obsolete way the tech industry thinks about cloud architecture as it relates to disaster prevention.

1) Just how much foresight is a cloud provider legally expected to have? In the section titled "May the Limitation of Liability Clause Be Circumvented?" Silver describes how "one court recently sustained a claim of gross negligence and/or recklessness in a cloud computing/loss of data case because it was alleged that the provider failed to take adequate steps to protect the data." This raises the question of what constitutes "failure to take adequate steps". Does it mean that the provider did something genuinely negligent like setting up a system with multiple single points of failure? Were they culpable because they had followed best practices and relied upon an industry-standard failover-based recovery system which later failed? Or did they fail to seek out (or create) the most advanced and reliable proactive business continuity system on the planet? Whatever they were using probably seemed good at the time but was clearly not adequate because it failed to protect the customer's data.

I would speculate that a customer’s lawyer would have a pretty high expectation of what "adequate steps" are, but as you will see in my next point the bar is still set pretty low.

2) The expectation is that cloud providers will be using failover, which is 20 years out of date. In the same section, Silver asks "Were back-ups of data stored in different regions? Were banks of computers isolated from one another ready to take over if another zone failed?" This without doubt describes a failover system. Apparently his expectation is that a cloud provider should follow current best practices and use a failover disaster recovery system. But the failover technique was designed decades ago for systems that are now extinct or nearly so. The latest networks are radically more sophisticated than their forebears and consequently have radically different requirements. Even a successful failover is a perilous thing, and failovers fail all the time. If they didn't, Mr. Silver would probably not have found it necessary to write this article. Backups happen only on fixed schedules so the most recent transactions are often lost during a disaster. You can expect legal battles over downtime and data loss to continue because cloud providers and their customers are all using one variation or another of these outdated disaster recovery techniques. So how can a disaster recovery system that is so prone to disaster be considered an "adequate step?"

Like I said, you'd better call a meeting with your legal counsel and get ready.

No Outage, No Litigation

ZeroNines can actually eliminate outages. Our Always Available™ technology processes all network transactions simultaneously and in parallel on multiple cloud nodes or servers that are geographically separated. If something fails and brings down Cloud Node A, Nodes B and C continue processing everything as if nothing had happened. There is no hierarchy and no failover. So if this cloud provider's service does not go offline there is no violation of SLAs and no cause for litigation.

Our approach to business continuity is far superior to the failover paradigm, offering in excess of five nines (>99.999%) of uptime. It is suitable for modern generations of clouds, virtual servers, traditional servers, colocation hosting, in-house servers, and the applications and databases that clients will want to run in all of these.

So my message to cloud providers is to check out ZeroNines and Always Available as a means of protecting your service from downtime and the litigation that can come with it.

My message to cloud customers is that you can apply ZeroNines and Always Available whether your cloud provider is involved or not. After all, your key interest here is to maintain business continuity, not to win a big settlement over an outage.

And heads-up to the lawyers on both sides: We are setting a new standard in what constitutes "adequate steps".

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

January 23, 2012

RIM co-CEOs Resign: Is This the Cost of Downtime?

Back in October I commented in this blog about the enormous RIM BlackBerry outage [source]. I wrote that "even a massive outage like this is unlikely to cause the demise of a large and important firm, but combined with other woes like a less-than-competitive product and poor business model it could well be the deciding factor."

And now for the fallout. RIM is still in business, but its beleaguered co-CEOs/co-Chairmen Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis have resigned and taken other positions within the company [source]. I'm sure it was not the outage alone (or all RIM outages put together) that caused this leadership shakeup. But it could well have been the deciding factor.

Outages and CEO Job Security

RIM's product problems are certainly serious. But I see a fundamental difference between 1) the prescience needed to get the right product to market at the right time, and 2) the technical ability to keep an existing product up and running. Customers might to some degree forgive a company whose product is reliable but behind the times. They will abandon if it doesn't work when they need it even if it is the newest, slickest thing around.

The October outage has RIM "facing a possible class action lawsuit in Canada" [source]. Add the cost of that in addition to the costs of recovery, customer abandonment, shareholder value and so forth. (Stay tuned; I will be commenting on the legal issues around cloud outages in the next few days.)

To put RIM's decline in perspective, the company was worth $70 billion a few years ago but today has a market value of about $8.9 billion [source]. Their stock dropped about 75% last year and was down to $16.28 before the market opened on Monday January 23, 2012 [source].

So according to the rules of modern business, someone has to pay and in this case it is the CEOs.

Now Imagine This at a Smaller Company

Can you imagine a three-day outage at a smaller software company? Or even a one-day outage? Imagine a typical e-commerce technology provider with 50 retail customers, 100 employees, and an SaaS application. If the core application, image server, database server, customer care system, inventory system, orders & fulfillment system, or other key element goes down that could be the end of them. Many smaller companies do not survive a significant downtime event. And many smaller retailers do not survive if they are unable to do business on a key shopping day such as Black Friday or Cyber Monday.

Or even if the email system goes down for a couple hours. It happens all the time. Email is a key element of workflow and productivity and what company can afford to sit still for even a couple hours?

It's more than the CEO whose job is at risk. Here's where an ounce of prevention is worth far more than a pound of cure.

That Rickety Old Failover

Remember my earlier comment about outdated yet reliable products, versus outdated and unreliable products? Ironically, the failover disaster recovery model that failed RIM back in October is one of those old and unreliable products. It was designed for systems and architectures that no longer bear any resemblance to what businesses are actually using. If failover worked I would not be writing this because there would be no need for its replacement.

But if you want to find out about real business continuity and getting away from failover, take a look at ZeroNines. Our Always Available™ architecture processes in multiple cloud locations, on multiple servers, and in multiple nodes. There is no hierarchy so if one goes down the others continue processing all network transactions. ZeroNines can bring application uptime to virtually 100%. It is a complete departure from the failover that RIM is using, and that small businesses everywhere stake their futures upon.

Time Will Tell

"RIM earned its reputation by focusing relentlessly on the customer and delivering unique mobile communications solutions… We intend to build on this heritage to expand BlackBerry's leadership position," RIM's new CEO Thorsten Heins is quoted as saying [source].

Let's hope this "focus on the customer" also includes a strategic initiative to build genuine uptime and availability, or maybe we'll be reading about another new RIM CEO next January.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

December 12, 2011

BAE, Microsoft, the Cloud, and Planning for When it All Goes Horribly Wrong

"If it fails in Ireland, it goes to Holland. But what if it fails in Holland as well?"
Paraphrase of Charles Newhouse, BAE [source]

Cloud news circuits have been abuzz the last few days over BAE rejecting Microsoft's Office 365 cloud solution because of the Patriot Act. This is the highest-profile rejection of a cloud offering I have seen. I am shocked and dismayed that after all the advancements that have improved continuity in the cloud, the network architectures our cloud service providers are offering are still in the stone age. They're still trying to use failover and pass it off as advanced and reliable. I can only assume that if given a 787 they would try to fly it off a dirt landing strip.

When you read the articles closely, it is clear that the big issue for BAE was data sovereignty. How does one retain control of data during a network disaster, and where does it go when your service provider has to failover from the primary network node to the backup? To quote Charles Newhouse, head of strategy and design at British defense contractor BAE,

"We had these wonderful conversations with Microsoft where we were going to adopt Office 365 for some of our unrestricted stuff, and it was all going to be brilliant. I went back and spoke to the lawyers and said, '[The data center is in] Ireland and then if it fails in Ireland go to Holland.' And the lawyers said 'What happen[s] if they lose Holland as well?'" [source]

And earlier in the same article he described the user experience during a cloud outage:

"A number of high profile outages that users have suffered recently demonstrated just how little control you actually have. When it all goes horribly wrong, you just sit there and hope it is going to get better. There's nothing tangibly you can do to assist" [source].

It's About More than Just the Patriot Act

The big focus in these articles is the Patriot Act. BAE lawyers forbade the use of Office 365 and the Microsoft public cloud because as a U.S. company, Microsoft could be required to turn BAE data over to the U.S. government under terms of the Patriot Act [source].

It is true that the Patriot Act can require cloud service providers like Microsoft (and Amazon, Google, and others) to give the U.S. government the data on their servers, even if those servers are housed outside the United States [source]. Newhouse also said that "the geo-location of that data and who has access to that data is the number one killer for adopting to the public cloud at the moment" [source].

But European governments are already moving to eliminate this loophole. As explained in November on ZDNet.com, a new European directive "will not only modernize the data protection laws, but will also counteract the effects of the Patriot Act in Europe" [source]. Sounds to me like Microsoft's jurisdictional problems will be solved for them. And failing that there is probably some creative and legal business restructuring that would do the trick.

It's Really about Failover and its Shortcomings

So if European law will provide data sovereignty from a legal standpoint, why reject the Microsoft cloud? It all comes back to "when things go horribly wrong."

When Newhouse describes the Ireland-to-Holland scenario, he is clearly talking about Microsoft failing-over from their Ireland datacenter to their Holland datacenter. I find it hard to believe that Microsoft thinks the outdated and flawed failover model is suitable for a leading cloud offering. Office 365 and their customers deserve better.

Apparently BAE agrees. It put its foot down and refused to play because the reality does not match the promise.

Failovers often fail, causing the downtime they were supposed to prevent. If the secondary site fails to start up properly (which is very common) or suffers an outage of its own, the business is either a) still offline or b) failed over to yet another location. The customer quickly loses control, network transactions get lost, and their data goes… where? Another server in Europe? Part of an American cloud? How many locations is Microsoft prepared to failover to, and where are they? And with the cloud these issues loom even larger because there is no particular machine that houses the data.

The Solution: Cloud and Data Reliability without Failover

ZeroNines offers two potential scenarios that will solve this problem:

1) Prevent downtime on Protect the cloud provider's systems from downtime, offering a far more reliable cloud.

2) Protect the business' systems from a cloud provider's downtime.

Our Always Available technology is designed to provide data and application uptime well in excess of five nines. ZenVault Medical has been running in the cloud on Always Available for about 14 months with true 100% uptime. Always Available runs multiple network and cloud nodes in distant geographical areas. All servers and nodes are hot, and all applications are active. If one fails, the others continue processing as before, with no interruption to the business or the user experience. There is no failover, and thus no chance for outages caused by a failed failover.

So if Microsoft were to adopt our Always Available technology, a storm like the one that knocked out their data center in Ireland this past August would not affect service. The Ireland node might go down, but all network activities would proceed as usual on other cloud data centers in Holland, Italy, or wherever they have set them up. Users would never know it.

If BAE adopted Always Available, they could bring their Microsoft cloud node into an Always Available array with other cloud nodes or data centers of their own choosing. A failure in one simply means that business proceeds on the others.

The business or the service provider can determine which nodes are brought into the array. BAE could choose to use only European cloud nodes to maintain data sovereignty.

ZeroNines' Always Available technology is built precisely for the moment "when it all goes horribly wrong." The difference is that with ZeroNines, it won't mean downtime.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

December 1, 2011

Retail Business Continuity on Black Friday and Cyber Monday

The economy has heaved a sigh of relief after good sales reports from the Thanksgiving weekend. Have you stopped to really think about the importance of reliable IT systems and business continuity during this and other key sales events?

A company really may live or die according to what it or its service provider does in preparation for Black Friday and Cyber Monday. The game is in the hands of the technicians more and more every year.

While these two days can herald great things during a good year, they can also seem like harbingers of doom if things don't go so well. Their grim-sounding names are oddly appropriate, and everyone watches with trepidation.

• Black Friday. Very ominous, evoking images of stock market crashes and other disasters. A few decades ago it came to mean "the day after Thanksgiving in which retailers make enough sales to put themselves 'into the black ink'" [source] which is actually a good thing.

• Cyber Monday. Sounds like something from The Terminator. Actually… "The term 'Cyber Monday' was coined in 2005 by Shop.org, a division of the National Retail Federation [source]." This is the Monday after Thanksgiving, when online sales show a significant spike. Cyber Monday has become a major shopping day and economic indicator in its own right.

Jittery analysts are poised every year with their thumb on the Recession Early Warning button, ready to sound the alarm if the score doesn't add up and the game goes badly. (I think they secretly enjoy this.)

It's All IT's Fault. But No Pressure, Guys! : )

Every year in advance of this season opener, IT Managers beg for money to upgrade servers, replace old circuit breakers and backup batteries, service the cooling systems, and do a thousand other things to help prop up their networks for the onslaught. They also stock up on the coffee, donuts, and Valium that will keep them going through long days and even longer nights of watching, waiting, rebooting, hot swapping, and occasionally panicking over system crashes and failovers. I do not envy them, as the fate of the economy apparently rests upon their shoulders.

If the IT systems go down the business is out of the game and the term "Black Friday" takes on an entirely new meaning. Revenue on Thanksgiving weekend is largely driven by time-sensitive discounts, so shoppers will buy from competitors if a website or point-of-sale (POS) system is down. For those of you running these systems, my heart goes out to you. I have been in similar situations myself many times.

Thanksgiving Weekend Outages Mostly Due to Heavy Traffic

There were a number of reports of ecommerce sites becoming unavailable on Thanksgiving, Black Friday, and Cyber Monday. Victoria's Secret went beyond secret and became downright invisible three separate times, for a total of about 80 minutes [source]. I have read about downtime and poor site performance at many other online retailers as well, including PC Mall and Crutchfield [source]. Universally, there is no mention of the cause of all this downtime, but the implication is that it was simple old-fashioned traffic overload.

Fire Suppression System Suppresses Sales on eBay

One outage not caused by traffic was ProStores, an online store solution used by lots of smaller operations to run their eBay storefronts. According to a Thanksgiving Day post by ProStores on their discussion board, "the data center fire suppression system tripped the Emergency Power Off (EPO) system causing a loss of power to the data center's raised floor environment" [source]. As is usual in such circumstances, it took most of the day before things could be brought back to normal. I strongly suggest you read their post, as it is an excellent account of the gyrations an IT department has to go through in such situations. I applaud ProStores for being so forthright and providing this information.

Preventing this and Other Outages

Always Available technology from ZeroNines could have prevented the ProStores outage entirely. Yes, that faulty fire suppression system would still have freaked out at that particular data center. But Always Available would have been running one, two, or more instances of the same applications and transactions in the cloud or at other data centers. ProStores clients and their customers would never have known there was a power outage and no sales would have been lost.

ProStores made no mention at all of failover, so I assume they do not have a failover-based recovery system in place. With ZeroNines, that's perfectly fine because we do not use failover either. We make failover unnecessary. We offer disaster avoidance, not disaster recovery. There is no way to prevent all system malfunctions because there are too many complex parts. Next month maybe a circuit breaker will fail. After that, maybe it's a failed hard disk and an application crash. The list goes on.

Girding Your Loins for Next Year

Online retailers wanting to guard themselves against a Black Friday blackout (or on any other day) should consider the modular approach ZeroNines takes. You can apply Always Available to selected high-value systems such as:

  • Webstore servers and databases
  • Product/inventory databases
  • Payment systems
  • Image rendering systems
These will keep you running if something blows up. Close behind are customer service systems and warehousing/fulfillment. These become more important the closer you get to Christmas, as last-minute shoppers tend to need more personal help and there is no leeway for late shipments.

To prevent traffic-related outages, set up proper load balancing. If huge players like J.C. Penney, Apple, Macy's, Sears, Amazon, and Dell can come through Cyber Monday with flying colors [source], you can too. But for the hardware failures, human mistakes, software crashes, and other things that can hit you any day of the year as well, look into ZeroNines.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

October 13, 2011

What Did One BlackBerry User Say to the Other BlackBerry User?

Nothing, according to twitter user @giselewaymes (source).

In what has to be every large enterprise IT manager's worst nightmare, a big high profile outage grew into a monster, expanded to global proportions, made headlines everywhere, and after three days seemed to have no end in sight. The cause was a failed failover that could have been avoided.

Background: RIM BlackBerry 

BlackBerry is produced by Canadian firm Research In Motion (RIM). It is one of the leading smart phones among business users. Its real forte is encrypted mobile email and instant messaging. BlackBerry has about 70 million users worldwide (source). Several high-profile outages and many smaller ones have tarnished its reputation, and this week's seems to be pushing the company to the breaking point if all the buzz on the Internet is to be believed.

The Problem: Failed failover 

On Monday morning October 10 2011, millions of BlackBerry users in Europe, the Middle east, and Africa lost access to messenger, email, and Internet. The outage spread to every continent and may eventually have effected half of all BlackBerry users (source).

RIM explained things to some degree on their website on Tuesday October 11: "The messaging and browsing delays that some of you are still experiencing were caused by a core switch failure within RIM’s infrastructure. Although the system is designed to failover to a back-up switch, the failover did not function as previously tested (source).

In other words, their failover-based disaster recovery system failed. It can be inferred that this led to cascading failures that knocked out other systems in other regions, leading to this worldwide problem. As of Wednesday evening the 12th it was still not fully resolved, with an interesting update posted on their site outlining the status in various parts of the world (source). By Thursday morning it looked like things were finally under control, with service almost back to normal in most areas.

The Cost: Paid compensation and a blow to the business 

I don't doubt that RIM will compensate users in one way or another, perhaps in the form of free service (which seems to be the industry's de-facto compensation currency). RIM Co-CEO Jim Balsillie said that such a step would be considered but that their immediate focus was fixing the problem (source).

More damaging is the additional blow to RIM's reputation. Lots of users are claiming on Facebook, Twitter, and other online forums that this is the last straw and that they will quit BlackBerry. For many this may be a hollow threat but there is genuine peril here. "This outage… comes at a particularly bad time for RIM, since it faces increasing competition in the smarpthone market… Apple's iPhone and phones on the Google Android operating system have been gaining ground, and the new iPhone 4S goes on sale Friday (October 14)" (source).

The cost can be high outside of RIM as well. "The outage caught much of D.C. off guard Wednesday and underscored the region’s reliance on the BlackBerry — which is still the only federally approved smartphone for employees in some government agencies (source).

As for RIM itself, back in June there was a flurry of articles suggesting RIM was potentially facing bankruptcy (source). And this week there have been a number of stories about growing momentum for a RIM breakup or merger (source). Even a massive outage like this is unlikely to cause the demise of a large and important firm, but combined with other woes like a less-than-competitive product and poor business model it could well be the deciding factor.

The Solution: Eliminate failover systems

RIM is in trouble for a number of reasons but downtime like this does not need to be one of them. I contend that the core problem was not a failed switch but a failed failover. Switches will fail and there is no avoiding that. If you can architect the perfect switch, I invite you to do so and you'll be richer than Bill Gates.  It's what happens after the inevitable switch malfunction (or other disaster) that matters most. Failover systems will fail too. RIM's apparently worked fine during a test but the strain and chaos of a real-world crisis was too much for it. At ZeroNines, we propose eliminating the failover systems in favor of something that will turn failures into virtual non-events.

ZeroNines' Always Available™ technology eliminates the need for failover, processing the same applications and data simultaneously on multiple servers, clouds, and virtual servers separated by thousands of miles. All servers are hot, and all applications are active. So if a switch fails in one network instance there is no need for a risky failover to another. Other instances are already processing the same transactions in parallel and simply continue processing as if nothing had happened. Once the problem with the switch is rectified, that instance is brought back into the Always Available array, is automatically updated, and resumes processing along with the others.

The Numbers

RIM says that its service "has been operational for 99.7% of the time over the last 18 months" (source). That equates to about 1,576.8 minutes of downtime, or 26.28 hours per year.

A good industry standard for uptime is 99.9% or three nines. That is 525.6 minutes of downtime, or 8.76 hours per year.

ZeroNines can provide in excess of five nines of uptime, or 99.999%. That is less than 5.3 minutes of downtime per year.

I do not know if planned downtime was included in RIM's 99.7% calculation. Companies often do not include planned downtime in their business continuity projections, counting only unplanned outages. But downtime is downtime from a user's perspective, whether caused by an accident or a planned maintenance cycle. ZeroNines protects against both.

In the last 12 months since ZenVault Medical went live on an Always Available cloud-based architecture it has experienced true 100% uptime, with no downtime whatsoever for any reason. That includes planned maintenance, upgrades, and other events that would have taken an ordinary network offline. 


Visit the ZeroNines.com website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture can protect businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

January 22, 2010

Twitter Grows Up and then Falls Down

Do you Twitter? Or Tweet? Or whatever they call it? Gotta admit, I don’t. So I didn’t really pay much attention when I first heard that Twitter had gone down the other day [source]. Life goes on. But what a good thing (I thought) that this had not happened a week ago when Twitter took the spotlight on the world stage as it helped gather money for earthquake relief in Haiti.

That made positive headlines everywhere. But if the outage had occurred during the first critical hours or days of the relief effort, a self-righteous world would instead have sneered at Twitter for having failed, despite the fact that Twitter was never billed as a source of disaster relief. This is a window into an important reality: you’d better plan uptime into your system because you never know when you will be caught in the spotlight.

Background: Twitter Comes of Age

Twitter is an instant messaging system that allows short messages of up to 140 characters to be sent to a subscriber’s contacts, or be made available to the Twitter community at large. Millions of people use Twitter every day. Data reported in Wikipedia [source] shows that over 75% of the messages on Twitter are either “conversational” or “pointless babble.” A small but powerful percentage of messages are for far more serious purposes. Twitter was drafted into service for political campaigning, education, public relations, and emergencies long before the Haiti earthquake. But I see its Haiti relief efforts as the moment it came of age, when Twitter was first used to mobilize money on a mass worldwide scale for a focused, responsible, humanitarian purpose.

The Problem: A Failover Failure

On the morning of Wednesday January 20, 2010, Twitter became virtually inaccessible. According to Information Week, "A sudden failure coupled with problems in switching to a backup system produced a high number of errors for around 90 minutes" [source]. In other words, an unspecified failure in one place forced the system to rely on its “failover” architecture, which in turn failed. This is a classic failover failure.

The Cost: Hard to Quantify but Scary to Contemplate

Since Twitter service is free, there may be no direct cost to Twitter. Indirectly, this event contributes negatively to Twitter’s overall equation for obtaining venture capital, building a positive public image, and eventually making money off of paid services.

And here’s where we get into very uncertain territory. What would the cost have been if it had happened just a few days earlier? Would millions of dollars in aid to Haiti have been delayed or failed to materialize? Would people who were saved by this aid have died? Possibly. At the very least, Twitter would have experienced a PR storm far more serious than the January 20 outage caused.

The Solution: Ditch the Failover

Failover (also known as cutover) is the de facto recovery solution for dealing with IT disasters, but it contains inherent flaws that often prevent it from working at the very moment it is needed. Vast numbers of companies and other organizations in the U.S. and around the world rely on failover to keep them functioning in the event of their own disasters, be they failed server equipment or regional catastrophes.

ZeroNines has designed an Always Available™ business continuity architecture that does away with failover entirely. No backup systems ever need to kick in with only microseconds of notice. Instead, processing of all network transactions occurs continually, simultaneously, and equally in multiple locations. Long and short, Always Available prevents disasters like Twitter’s 90 minute outage on Wednesday. Instead of relying on a cutover event to succeed, Always Available simply continues running the same apps and data at one of two or three additional locations, with no interruption to the user.

A Parting Thought

Systems like Twitter’s, which rely on failover in the event of disasters, currently form the backbone of business and government information systems. Suppose that earthquake had happened somewhere in the U.S. (which one day it will) and knocked out data centers, communications, and other key infrastructure? If the failover systems fail like they failed Twitter (which they will), then what is the prospect for marshalling aid within our own borders? A scary thing to consider.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture can protect businesses (and government agencies) of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

November 23, 2009

Fixing The FAA’s Single Point of Failure

“The difficulties started when a single circuit board in a piece of networking equipment at a computer center in Salt Lake City failed around 5 a.m…” [source]

All too often it seems that the biggest problems are caused by the smallest failures. This blog is full of posts about how generator transfer switches, router programming changes, and problematic network hardware can bring businesses to their knees. Now a single circuit board failure causes havoc among airlines, airports, and air travelers.

I stand by my earlier assertion: Trying to guarantee application and data uptime by eliminating all possible sources of failure is not possible. The more complex a system gets, the more likely some part is going to fail, and it is impossible to identify them all. But there is a way to prevent these little disasters from becoming big ones.

Background: The Flight Plan Management System

The failed FAA computer system was the National Airspace Data Interchange Network [source], which manages flight plans and ground traffic. This is one of two nationwide computer centers that collects flight plans. The other is in Atlanta. This was the third time since June 2007 the system has failed [source].

The Problem: Hardware Failure Blocks Access

When the circuit board failed on November 19, 2009, access to data and communications was blocked, making flight plans filed by airlines inaccessible [source]. Air traffic controllers had to enter flight plans manually in several parts of the U.S. The problem was fixed about five hours later.

The Cost: Mostly to the Airlines

The FAA being a governmental agency, no direct fiscal impact can be readily estimated. However, the cost to airlines has to be considerable, since many flights were canceled or delayed. Airline stocks were down that day – whether the computer failure was the cause or not – and our poor beleaguered airlines can’t help but suffer when something like this happens. They were still down even after the problem had been fixed [source]. And of course individual travelers, such as myself, will bear the brunt too in the form of delays, costlier alternative travel, and unplanned hotel stays. Not to mention missed business meetings which can cost a business a lot more than a replacement airline ticket. The domino effect of airline delays is a disaster unto itself.

The Solution: Sidestep the Single Point of Failure

Doug Church, a spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said…"We think it's a single-point failure that occurred somewhere in the system," he said. "One single glitch was able to shut down the entire system." [source]

This is perhaps the scariest statement about the whole affair. The simple fact that they went dark shows that their backup systems also failed. This is not surprising; most disaster recovery systems use the “failover” or “cutover” technique which is outdated, unreliable and can lead to cascading failures and increased downtime. Such occurrences are frighteningly common.

At ZeroNines we propose a different approach. Instead of trying to catch a downtime event with a failover recovery, like a ninja trying to catch an arrow, we simply double up all the processing in multiple data centers around the country or around the world. Each processes the same thing at the same time so if “a single circuit board in a piece of networking equipment at a computer center in Salt Lake City” fails, the additional networking equipment in Atlanta or Omaha or Dusseldorf or wherever keeps on processing.

The likelihood of application or data downtime – where users lose access to the tools and information they need to do their jobs – drops to virtually zero because the chances of all data centers, or clouds, or virtual environments failing simultaneously is statistically negligible. In this instance, had the National Airspace Data Interchange Network been protected by our Always Available™ technology, the Atlanta network node would simply have continued processing while Salt Lake City was repaired and brought back online. Then the system would have automatically updated Salt Lake with all the transactions that had occurred in its absence.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture can protect businesses (and government agencies) of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

October 22, 2009

Enabling Cloud Confidence

A week ago I wrote about the Sidekick disaster and how events like that just keep doubts growing, pushing the wholesale adoption of the Cloud further away. This doubt has made it into the mainstream media, where it will taint the opinions of potential cloud users, both consumer and commercial. We at ZeroNines think we have the solution that will enable the cloud to perform as it needs to.

The core problem with outages is not the existence of hazards that can damage servers and knock elements of a network (cloud or otherwise) offline. Storms, fires, and equipment failure will always happen and there is no way to eliminate them. The real problem is the reliance of cloud providers on obsolete failover-based recovery paradigms that simply can’t maintain continuity when disaster does strike.

L.A. Times columnist David Sarno perfectly sums up the cloud’s tenuous situation in his October 18 article “Still hazy on cloud computers' security” [source]. “A series of incidents involving cloud computing over the last several months has poked holes in the hype bubble, raising questions about the cloud's dependability -- and whether it's ready for use by a broader group of workers and businesses.” He is right on target.

Meeting the Need to Fortify

As Sarno puts it, “As e-mail, word processing and data storage continue to move from users' computers to the Web, companies must fortify their servers from a variety of potential disasters -- natural and man-made -- to help ensure that the data and the applications are accessible at all times.” He quotes Google’s SEC filing:

"(Google’s) systems are vulnerable to damage or interruption from earthquakes, terrorist attacks, floods, fires, power loss, telecommunications failures, computer viruses, computer denial of service attacks" as well as sabotage and vandalism...
The good news is that today, ZeroNines' Always Available™ CloudNines™ technology can fortify servers from damage or interruption from earthquakes, terrorist attacks, floods, fires, power loss, telecommunications failures, computer denial of service attacks, as well as sabotage and vandalism. We leave the viruses to others to deal with, but we can add most types of routine maintenance, unplanned maintenance, data migrations, equipment upgrades, software upgrades, and a number of other potential causes of downtime.

Forget Failover

The IT world fatalistically believes that downtime is inevitable, and is something to be lived with and minimized if you’re fortunate. This view predominates because until now the only disaster recovery solution available has been the flawed failover paradigm, which everyone in IT knows can be a disaster unto itself. During a crisis or failover event, cutover can cause additional problems, downtime, and cascading application failures as computing switches from primary to backup systems.

But the IT world has it wrong. Disasters will happen and must be dealt with, but the downtime they cause can be prevented.

Always Available™ Means Virtually 100% Uptime

ZeroNines’ Always Available™ solution eliminates failover and backups, instead providing synchronous identical processing on multiple cloud nodes geographically separated by thousands of miles. If a storm wipes out your East Coast cloud, CloudNines enables processing to continue on clouds in other parts of the country and around the world. If you need to upgrade server software, you can isolate one cloud node, do your upgrade, and bring it back online once it is stable. Our technology has journaling and updating features to assure that all transactions are completed and that any cloud node that goes offline is brought up to the most accurate logical state once it comes back online.

CloudNines can push application availability beyond the industry-accepted standard of 99.999% (five nines) to virtually 100%. In our ongoing test case, the ZeroNines MyFailSafe environment has never experienced any downtime at all, for any reason. It went live in July 2004, and had individual network nodes knocked offline a number of times due to hurricanes, power outages, server migrations, and other causes. All applications experienced full 100% availability throughout.

Will ZeroNines eventually be recognized as a vital cloud-enabling technology? That remains to be seen but you can bet that is how we see ourselves. If you want to find out how we can make the cloud a viable option for you, let me know.

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines

October 15, 2009

Sidekick: Two Disasters for the Price of One Really Big One

Already being called one of the largest data failures in recent memory, October’s Sidekick disaster was actually two disasters rolled into one. First, the cloud-based service suffered an outage which stranded thousands of users. Second, the backup/storage system failed and erased the personal data of thousands of users. Every failure like this leads to a round of hand-wringing over the cloud, and this one is no different. It underscores the need for a far more robust cloud architecture, where a failure in one area is truly isolated from the rest of the system and can’t cause an outage.

Background: Sidekick and the Cloud

The Sidekick mobile device is developed by Microsoft subsidiary Danger and is sold and serviced by T-Mobile. It holds a special place in the hearts and hands of a select group of users because its QWERTY keyboard promises ease of use and its cloud-based data storage gives it the appearance of real go-anywhere, do-it-anytime utility. Unlike other hand-helds like the iPhone and Blackberry, the Sidekick backs up personal data to cloud-based storage at Microsoft and not to your computer’s hard drive. And there’s the seed of the trouble.

The problem: Hardware Failure Leads to Database Failure

It seems that beginning at about 1:30 AM on Friday October 2 [source], a “hardware failure… took out both the primary and backup copies of the database that contained Sidekick users' information.” [source] This apparently occurred during an upgrade to the Danger/Microsoft Storage Area Network [source]. When they discovered their Sidekicks weren’t working, many users re-set their Sidekicks (some under instructions from T-Mobile customer service) which wiped the devices’ hard drives. Combined with the back-end server failure, this led to apparent permanent data loss for anyone who tried to re-set their Sidekicks.

The cost to T-Mobile and Microsoft

This is going to cost millions. At least. T-Mobile halted sales of all Sidekicks shortly after the event and is compensating its affected users with a period of free data service [source]. There were the usual rants about users refusing to continue paying on their contracts, and news that T-Mobile was voluntarily letting anyone out of their contract who wanted out [source]. Lawsuits were filed [source]. Sarcasm and criticism runs thick online. Whatever the actual facts, this is a marketing disaster of the greatest degree for T-Mobile and Microsoft. There is no way to calculate how many of the approximately 800,000 existing sidekick customers [source] will jump ship, how many potential new customers will be lost, and what this means for Microsoft’s “Pink” project, intended follow-on to the Sidekick [source].

The Solution: A Robust Cloud

ZeroNines’ CloudNines™ product enables the cloud to function as it is supposed to, by processing every transaction simultaneously and equally on multiple cloud-based network nodes in an Always Available™ configuration. In the Sidekick disaster, CloudNines would simply have cut off the node with the hardware failure. All processing would have continued on other geographically separated nodes that were running identical active instances of the affected applications and databases. The failure would have been contained. There would have been no service downtime, and no need for ill-advised attempts to re-boot individual Sidekicks.

Not only would the Sidekick applications have continued operation, but the databases would too. There would have been no apparent loss of customer data. After the event, one author bitingly asked “But the question remains, why wasn't there a true independent backup of the data?” [source]. ZeroNines and Always Available technology would have made this a moot point.

As of this writing, T-Mobile and Microsoft have announced that they “have recovered most, if not all, customer data” [source]. I can’t help but breathe a sigh of relief for them even though I am not a Sidekicker myself. But wouldn’t it have been far better to have avoided the problem in the first place?

Visit the ZeroNines website to find out more about how our disaster-proof architecture protects businesses of any description from downtime.

Alan Gin – Founder & CEO, ZeroNines